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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
RAYMOND B. MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

8854

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The respondent, Mr. Maxfield, was injured on the· 25th
day of July, 1955, about eight miles west of Green River on
U. S. Highway 50-6 at about three o'clock p. m. (R. 23).
He was a passenger in the rear of a railroad truck
which was owned and operated by the appellant railroad.
The driver lost control of the truck which tipped over. The
respondent sustained injuries to his left shoulder. He was
taken to the hospital at Price where he was an ambulatory
patient for approximately eight days. He was under the
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treatment of Dr. Hubbard who later testified as a witness
in the case.
X-rays taken at the time of his injury showed that his
left shoulder had been dislocated. It was placed back in
position and his arm immobilized in a sling. After leaving
the hospital he returned to his home at Green River. He
was not confined to his bed but was ambulatory. During
this time he drove his car from Green River to Price to
keep appointments with Dr. Hubbard. He saw Dr. Hubbard
for the last time a week before the 1st day of October (R.
29, 43).
He remained away from work from the 25th of July to
the 1st of October. He saw the doctor approximately five or
six times during this period. When he saw the doctor on the
last occasion he told him that he was ready to go back to
work.
One of the most important questions which arose in
the case was whether or not the respondent was bound by
the release which he executed. Prior to the date of signing
the release the respondent had requested the claim agent
to come to his home at Green River. There he had requested
from the Claim Agent an advancement of $200.00, which
advancement was paid to him. After he had been released
by the doctor to return to work, he again visited the Claim
Agent at the Claim Agent's office at Grand Junction and
discussed with him the settlement of his case. At that time
he states that the Claim Agent indicated a willingness to
pay him the sum of $710.00 for a full release. However,
he stateR that the only reason he signed this release was
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because the Claim Agent told him that if he did not do so
he would lose his employment. He also claims that the Claim
Agent told him that if he attempted to get a lawyer and
receive advice that he would lose his job. This was all
denied by the Claim Agent and by Mr. Kanderis who was
present with the Claim Agent during at least a part of these
conversations. The respondent at no time testified to any
facts or alleged facts which would indicate any basis for
a mutual mistake of fact or for that matter, for a simple
mistake of fact. His only excuse as determined from his
testimony for being relieved from the release was alleged
fraud on the part of the Claim Agent in allegedly forcing
him to execute the release by a threat that if he did not do
so or if he attempted to obtain legal advice he would lose
his job (R. 48).
The respondent, immediately following the execution
of the release, returned to his employment and has worked
steadily ever since said time and was working at the time
of trial.
The appellant in effect admits its negligence and admitted that the respondent was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his injuries. The only question before
the jury was the validity of the release, and assuming that
the release was valid, the extent of respondent's injury and
damages.
In support of the issue of damages, the respondent
called as his only witness, not the doctor who had treated
him, but Dr. Clegg who had been employed by his counsel
to examine him for the purpose of testifying as a witness
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in the case. Dr. Clegg did not see the respondent until almost two years after his shoulder injury. His examination
was confined to an examination of the left shoulder. This
consisted of neurological tests and of x-rays. The doctor
observed in the x-rays taken approximately two years after
respondent's injury that there was a calcium deposit on the·
top of the left shoulder which he believed would cause a
permanent partial disability of approximately ten percent
measured at the left shoulder. This disability in its relationship to the whole person would amount to a disability
of five percent or less. This disability was clearly related
to the callous formation (R. 66, 71).
In examining the respondent neurologically and examining muscle tone and condition, he concluded that the
left arm was being used normally in all respects (R. 69).
He did state that the respondent did complain of some pain
in the extremes of motion (R. 69). This callous formation,
the doctor stated, affected the respondent's ability to move
his left arm in the extremes of motion but not in the usual
ranges of motion. It was the cause of the permanent partial
disability.
The appellant called Dr. Hubbard who treated therespondent at the time of his injury until he was released to
return to his employment. Dr. Hubbard has practiced for
30 years in the industrial area around Price and Helper,
during which times he has specialized in general and traumatic surgery. He stated that the dislocated shoulder injury sustained by the respondent was relatively common;
in fact, he has treated about ten a year during the 30 years
he has practiced in Carbon County. He explained the naSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ture of the injury and stated that it was easily reduced
and that the only reason he gave the respondent a sedative
was to relax him so that the reduction would be made more
simple.
He was kept as an ambulatory patient for the purpose
of observation only, it being the practice to keep middleaged persons who have- received injury in a hospital for an
observation period to prevent blood clots, congested lungs
and other complications which sometimes accompany injuries (R. 109). He stated that placing a dislocated shoulder back into position is not very painful and is not complicated. He thought that the reduction had been very successful and that the respondent had made an uneventful
and completely successful recovery (R. 110).
The doctor produced in court the x-rays which he had
taken at the time of respondent's injury. He described a
callous formation existing on the top of respondent's left
shoulder and stated that such callous formations are common in people over 40, or even in their late 30s, and that it
is in the nature of an arthritic change. He compared the
x-rays taken by Dr. Clegg and the- x-rays taken at the Price
hospital and explained that the callous formation shown
in Dr. Clegg's pictures was also present in the x-rays taken
at the time of respondent's injury and that allowing for
the difference in the developing of the x-rays and allowing
for the angle at which the pictures were taken, the callous
formation shown in the x-rays taken at the time of respondent's injury and the x-rays taken by Dr. Clegg two years
later, were identical both in position and development (R.
112, 113).
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The doctor stated that before he released the respondent to return to work he had him move his arms in all the
different ranges of motion and explained that he could do
so without disability of any kind. When he was released
by the doctor to return to work he was not limited to light
duty but was released for all-purpose duty (R. 114).
At the conclusion of the evidence, the respondent moved
to amend the complaint, allegedly to conform the complaint
to the proof in connection with the alleged evidence relative
to a mutual mistake of fact. The court permitted this
amendment over appellant's objection (R. 128).
The case was submitted to the jury on the court's instructions and the jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent in the sum of $5,540.00, less $710.00, the amount
paid at the time a release was taken. Appellant made a
motion for a new trial, which motion was denied. From
the errors complained of and the denial of the court to grant
appellant's motion for a new trial, the appellant takes this
appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE
QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED TO SET
ASIDE A RELEASE.
POINT II.
rrHE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN PERMITTING THE RESPONDENT
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TO AMEND AND IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT.
(a)

It was error to permit respondent to cross
examine Mr. Stephen beyond the s·cope of
the direct examination and beyond the issues
formulated in the case.

(b)

The uncontradicted evidence fails to show
that the parties to the release executed the
release because of mutual mistake of fact.

(c)

The undisputed evidence shows that respondent did not sustain a permanent disability
as a proximate result of his injury.
P·OINT III.

THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE
ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING T'HE JURY ON THE
QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED TO SET
ASIDE A RELEASE.

The appellant requested the court to instruct the jury
that plaintiff had the burden of proving by clear and con-
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vincing evidence that he was entitled to be relieved of the
release which he had signed. The court after some consideration determined that the proper rule on the issue of
quantum of proof was a mere preponderance of the evidence and so instructed the jury. To the court's failure to
give appellant's request and to the court's instructions given
on the question of quantum of proof, the appellant duly
excepted. The issue here is simply which quantum of proof
should be applied in a Federal Employers' Liability Act in
the State of Utah.
This matter was before this court in Kirchgestner v.
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad CO'mpany, decided May
17, 1950, 218 P. 2d 685. In that case plaintiff sought to
recover damages for permanent and disabling injuries involving his lower back. Ten days after the alleged mishap
he executed a release for $135.00. While plaintiff had been
boarding a car, the grabiron which he grasped came loose,
causing him to fall to the ground where he struck his back
against a boulder. He felt no ill effects until the next day
when his back hurt him and he consulted Dr. Smith at
Salida. Dr Smith took X-rays which were negative and
gave the plaintiff some pills for his nerves. Four or five
days later after continued pain, the plaintiff saw a Dr.
Fuller at the same hospital who assured him that he would
be "all right.'' Thereafter, plaintiff saw the Claim Agent
at Pueblo who called Dr. Fuller and received assurance that
plaintiff was physically able to return to work. The Claim
Agent asked the plaintiff if he was ready to return to work
and received an affirmative reply. A release \Vas thereupon
executed which \Vas in the exact form as the one before this
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court. The plaintiff subsequently claimed he was unable
to do his work and discontinued the same, alleging that his
inability to work was caused by pain in his back. He was
not working at the time of the law suit. The court instructed the jury on mutual mistake of fact and instructed
the jury that it could set aside the release if it found a
mutual mistake by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in reviewing
this assignment of error said in its first opinion:
"We are unable to review this assignment of
error because the defendant did not take an exception to the instruction given to the jury. (Citing
cases.) Before leaving this matter, however, we
think the following observation in regard to the
nature and proof of a mutual mistake of fact may
prove helpful in cases involving the setting aside of
releases which may hereafter arise. * * * Since
mutual mistake of fact consists of a belief by both
parties that a certain fact exists whereas in reality
it does not exist or is not true, both the belief of the
parties in the supposed true fact and existence of
the true fact must be proved by the same degree of
proof. The mistake is a unit circumstance. One of
its prongs cannot be proved by a mere preponderance of evidence and other by clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence. Hence in a jurisdiction requiring mutual mistake of fact to be proved: by clear,
unequivocal and convincing evidence, (which the
author of this opinion thinks is required in this jurisdiction) if there is no doubt that both parties contracted in the light of a belief that a certain situation or condition was true and it is claimed by
one party that their belief was in fact a mistaken
belief, the latter must prove by clear, unequivocal
and convincing evidence that the situation or condi-
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tion in reliance on which the contract was made,
was at the time of making thereof different from
that which both. parties supposed or believed. And
if a jury is to determine whether the true fact is in
reality different from what the parties mutually
believed, such jury must find that fact by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence, and should be so
instructed."
The court, however, did not reverse the case until it
was subsequently heard on petition for rehearing, reported
in 233 P. 2d 699 under date of June 19, 1951. Justice Wolfe
in writing the unanimous opinion said:
"The appellant's petition for rehearing was
granted in this case to allow us to consider on its
merits the question whether the trial court erred
in denying the appellant's request that the jury be
instructed that in order to avoid the release executed
by the respondent, he must prove a mutual mistake
of fact by 'clear and unequivocal' evidence. Instead,
the court charged the jury that a mutual mistake of
fact need only be proved by a 'preponderance of the
evidence.' For the facts of the case, see our original
opinion, Utah~ 218 P. 2d 685.
"Upon the authorities cited in our opinion
granting the petition for rehearing~ Utah, 225 P.
2d 754, we conclude that the lower court erred in the
particular above mentioned and that such error
necessitates a reversal of the case for a new trial.
It would serve no useful purpose to further discuss
those authorities here."
And again:

"We had occasion recently to examine the expression. 'clear and convincing' evidence. See
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Greener v. Greener, Utah, 212 P. 2d 194, 205. There
we remarked that 'for a matter to be clear and convincing to a particular mind it must at least have
reached the point where there remains no serious or
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. A mind which was of the opinion that it
was convinced and yet which entertained, not a
slight, but a reasonable doubt as to the correctness
of its conclusion, would seem to be in a state of confusion.'
"Further, we said, 'That proof is convincing
which carries with it, not only the power to persuade
the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of
the fact it purports to prove, but has the element of
clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and convincing proof clinches what might be otherwise only
probable to the mind.' See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. City of San Antonio, Texas, D. C. Texas,
4 F. Supp. 570, 573, where it was stated that
proof is not 'clear and convincing' if the court entertains a reasonable doubt.
"It is pointed out by the respondent that in the
federal cases relied upon by us as authority for holding the trial court in error, the juries were required
to find mutual mistake by 'clear and convincing'
evidence and not by 'clear and unequivocal' evidence.
Respondent argues that the word 'unequivocal,' imposed upon him a greater burden than do the words,
'clear and convincing,' and hence the lower court
was justified in rejecting the appellant's requested
instruction. While perhaps it would be the better
practice in cases brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. 51 et seq., to instruct in the terms employed by the federal courts,
the use of the word 'unequivocal,' is not erroneous.
The dictionary definition of the word, 'unequivocal,'
is as follows: 'Not doubtful; not ambiguous; clear;
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sincere.' Thus if the word unequivocal means not
doubtful, not ambiguous or clear as employed in this
context, that term cast no burden upon the respondent which was not already upon him by virtue of
the word 'clear.' We believe the Federal rule requiring 'clear and convincing' evidence is preferable."
It should also be noted that Instruction No. 2.6 of Jury
Instruction Forms for Utah cites the Kirckgestner case as
authority for the following instruction:
"BURDEN OF PROOF IN AVOIDING RELEASE

"Concerning the release, Exhibit A, which (if
you find that it) was voluntarily signed by plaintiff
for a valuable consideration under such circumstances that the parties understood that a release
was being agreed upon, it would be binding upon
the plaintiff, and constitute a complete defense to
this action. The burden of proving the invalidity of
the release is upon the plaintiff. In order to avoid
its effect (he) must establish i~ invalidity by a degree of proof somewhat higher than the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence heretofore
defined and which is applicable to other issues in
this case. Before the release may be avoided he must
establish by evidence that is clear and convincing
that at the time of signing it he did not comprehend
the nature of the release and its consequences (or
that his ""ill 'Ya.s overcome by duress or undue influence)."
The court in its first opinion, in the K'lrchgest:ner case,
supra, referred to Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 332 U.
S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, wherein the Supreme Court of the
United States had considered a question of release. The
Supreme Court of Utah construed that case as holding in
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conformity with its opinion requiring clear and convinci:ng
evidence to set aside a release.
The Callen case arose under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. Plaintiff complained of a severe and permanent back injury. Defendant took a release from the plaintiff similar to the one in the instant case for $250.00. At the
trial plaintiff did not claim fraud but testifed he signed
a release in reliance on the Claim Agent's assurance that
"there was nothing wrong" and that he "could get back to
the job." At the trial it appeared from his testimony that
both he and the Claim Agent were mistaken ; that he in fact
had a permanent and serious injury and could not work.
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
"The release, as I have told the attorneys for
both sides, I do not consider binding insofar as it
applies to his permanent injuries, because the Pennsylvania Railroad certainly didn't know he was permanently injured * * * "
The Circuit Court of Appeals in the Third Circuit reversed the case on the grounds of this instruction and the
Supreme Court of the United States in commenting on said
fact said:
"The Circuit Court of Appeals, quite rightly we
think, construed the charge of the District Judge as
withdrawing the question of validity of the release
from the jury and said : 'This was palpable error
under the facts relating to the release and entirely
aside from the Court's incorrect assumption that
there was no dispute about the permanancy of the
injuries.' "
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The c·ourt then stated as follows:
"We are urged, however, to decide in this case
that the release was properly disregarded by the
trial court upon the ground that the burden should
not be on one who attacks a release, to show grounds
of mutual mistake or fraud, but should rest upon
the one who pleads such a contract, to prove the absence of those grounds. It is not contended that
this is or ever has been the law; rather, it is contended that it should be the law, at least as to railroad cases.''
The Court, however, in refusing to change the law as it
then existed, said :
"If the Congress were to adopt a policy depriving settlements of litigation of their prima facie
validity, it might also make compensation for injuries more certain and the amounts thereof less
speculative. But until the Congress changes the
statutory plan, the releases of railroad employees
stand on the same basis as the releases of others.
One who attacks a settlement must bear the burden
of showing that the contract he has made is tainted
with invalidity, either by fraud practiced upon him
or by a mutual mistake under which both parties
acted."
The United States Supreme Court finally, by majority
opinion, sustained the Third Circuit in the CaUen case with
four judges dissenting. The dissenting judges were Black,
Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge. These four thought that
the case should be reversed and that the railroad should
have the burden of proving that the release was not obtained by fraud or that there was not mutual mistake of
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fact. This is the present rule in admiralty cases~ Two; of
the dissenting judges are now deceased.
The Third Circuit, which was sustained in the Callen
case, supra, specifically held on the question quantum of
proof as follows:
"Prior to charging appellant's points above
quoted, the District Judge had advised the jUry that
the release was not binding in so far as it applied
to appellee's permanent injuries. This was palpable
error under the facts relating to the release and entirely aside from the Court's incorrect assumption
that there was no dispute about the permanency of
the injuries. Thereafter, in charging appellant's
points, though the Judge made a conscientious effort
to remedy the situation, he failed to tell the jury that
clear and convincing evidence of mutual mistake of
a rna terial fact was needed in order to set the release
aside. That type of instruction was especially important in view of the confusion which had been
created over the status of the release. Had a point
for charge covering this been among the fourteen
submitted on behalf of the appellant, it probably
would have solved the difficulty, but the failure to
suggest such point does not excuse the omission from
the charge of the law of that phase of the case which
should have been charged of the court's own motion."
It thus is clear that the Callen case clearly approved the
type instruction requested in the instant case. It is also
clear that the Utah Supreme Court has done likewise in
the Kirchgestner case, which is cited herein.
The respondent in effect is urging that the trial court
in the instant case should overrule the United States Su-
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preme. Court and the Utah Supreme Court because of the
Dice case, infra, and two subsequent Federal Circuit Court
cases. A consideration of these cases does not justify plaintiff's contention.

In Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Company, decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1951,
the facts were as follows :
The plaintiff, a railroad fireman, was seriously injured
when the engine jumped the track. The defendant plead
a release for $924.63. The plaintiff claimed fraud in the
inducement to the executiQn of the release. The jury
awarded $25,000 to plaintiff. The Ohio trial court set the
verdict aside, holding that (1) Ohio, not Federal law controlled, and (2) under the law petitioner was bound by his
release even though he had been induced to sign by false
statements, and (3) under Ohio l?w the factual issues involving a release should be decided by the court. The case
went to the Ohio Supreme Court which sustained with one
judge dissenting. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. That court said:
"We granted certiorari because the decision of
the Supreme Court of Ohio appeared to deviate from
previous decisions of this Court that federal law
governs cases arising under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. 342 U. S. 811, 72 S. Ct. 59."
On the second question the court said:
''We hold that the correct federal rule is that
announced by the Court of Appeals of Summit
County, Ohio, and the dissenting judge in the Ohio
Supreme Court-a release of rights under the Act
is void when the employee is induced to sign it by
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the deliberately false and material statements of the
railroad's authorized representatives made to deceive the employee as to the contents of the release."
On the third question the court said:
"The trial judge and the Ohio Supreme C()urt
erred in holding that petitioner's rights were to ·be
determined by Ohio law and in taking away petitioner's verdict when the issues of fraud had been
submitted to the jury on conflicting evidence and
determined in petitioner's favor."
The court then reversed and remanded the case, with four
judges dissenting.
It will be noted that the majority of the court made
no mention of the problem involving the question of quantum of proof, even though the Ohio Supreme Court referred
to the problem in its opinion and said:
"With respect to the burden of proof on this
question in the federal courts, it may be observed
that in the Callen case, the Circuit Court of Appeals,
in reversing the District Court, stated that 'evidence
in order to void the release, had to be clear, unequivocal, and convincing.' 3 Cir., 162 F. 2d 832-833.
This is the precise rule with respect to burden of
proof adopted by the trial judge in his finding in the
instant case. The decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals in the Callen case was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States."
The four dissenting judges dissented on questions not
material to the point here considered. During the course
of their dissent they said :
"Such proof of fraud need be only by a preponderance of the relevant evidence. See Union Pa-
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cific Railroad Company v. Harris, 158 U. S. 326, 15
S. Ct. 843, 39 L. Ed. 1003."

We have read the opinion in the Union Pacific case and
are unable to find anything therein which even remotely
deals with the question here at hand.
Finally the dissenting judges said :
"Moreover, we cannot say with confidence that
the Ohio trial judge applied the Federal standard
correctly. He duly recognized that 'the Federal law
controls as to the validity of a release pleaded and
proved in bar of the action, and the burden of showing that the alleged fraud vitiates the contract or
compromise or release rests upon the party attacking
the release.' And he made an extended analysis of
the relevant circumstances of the release, concluding,
however, that there was no 'clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence' of fraud. Since these elusive
words fail to assure us that the trial judge followed
the Federal test and did not require some larger
quantum of proof, we would return the case for
further proceedings on the sole question of fraud
in the release. 72 S. Ct. 312."
It must be assumed that the majority of the court did
not agree \vith the four dissenting judges on this point.
Also, it must be assumed as axiomatic that dissenting opinions are not the law.
During- oral argun1ent on appellant's motion for a new
tria], counsel for respondent cited to the court two Federal
deci~ions which \vere decided subsequent to the Dice case.
The first was Pur1'is v. Pennsylra.nia Railway Company,
198 F. 2d 631. This case arose in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff
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sustained injuries consisting of a bruised rib and nose
laceration. He signed a release for $45.00. He claimed
mutual mistake of fact and fraud in the inducement. The
jury found that plaintiff did not know what he was signing and gave a verdict for $1,000.00. The Third Cir?uit
in reviewing the case took upon itself the collateral and
moot issue of the quantum of proof required to set aside
a release. The court said :
"We are satisfied that if and when the problem
is squarely before the Supreme Court the rule pronounced will be in accord with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's above quoted language and therefore, in
fairness to the district judges of this circuit and to
ourselves, we adopt that test for this circuit in applicable instances."
In Camerlin v. New York Central Railroad Company,
199 F. 2d 698, the lower court in New York granted a summary judgment for defendant on a release case brought
under the F. E. L. A. The case was appealed to the First
Circuit where the case was reversed. In rendering its opinion the First Circuit said:
"In support of the judgment below, the defendant relies particularly upon Rader v. Lehigh Valley
R. R. Co., 3 Cir., 1928, 26 F. 2d 73, and Merwin v.
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co., 2 Cir.,
1933, 62 F. 2d 803. These cases bear considerable
factual resemblance to the case at bar. In the Rader
case, the appellate court sustained the trial judge
in directing a verdict for the defendant, and in the
Merwin case the appellate court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that a verdict
for defendant should have been directed. But in
each the court was applying the older rule that a
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release cannot be avoided except upon evidence which
is 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing.' This may
have been the rule at one time but, at least as applied to cases under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, we take the federal rule now to be, as was indicated in the recent case of Purvis v. Pennsylvania
R. R. Co., 3 Cir., 1952, 198 F. 2d 631, that it is
enough if the employee establishes, by a preponderance of the relevant evidence, the facts invalidating
the release."
It will be noted that the opinion relating to quantum
of proof in the Camerlin case was itself unnecessary to the
opinion and therefore little more than dicta. Furthermore,
the opinion it relies on to establsh the rule, viz., in the .
Purvis case, is obviously dicta. Finally, the dicta in the
Purvis case follows the dicta in the minority opinion in the
Dice case, supra.
Against the minority opinion in the Dice case, and the
subsequent dicta opinions in the two Circuit Court cases
cited herein, stands the majority and unoverruled opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in the Callen case and
the unanimous unoverruled decision in the Utah Supreme
Court in the K irchgestner case, all of which cases are considered herein.

POINT II.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN PERMITTING THE RESPONDENT
TO AMEND AND IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT.
(a)

It 1caB error to pcrrnit respondent to cross
e;1~a1ninc Afr. Stephen beyond tke scope of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
the direct examination and beyond the issues
formulated in the case.
The issues framed by the parties in their pleadings
and by the pretrial order limited the question on the release
to the matter stated in respondent's Reply to the Amended
Answer which is as follows :
"Defendant obtained said release and settlement from plaintiff by threatening plaintiff with
the loss of his job if he refused to accept said settlement; that said representation by defendant was
false and that plaintiff relied on said representation;

* * *"
During the examination of both respondent and the
witness Stephen, this was the only issue considered. However, on cross examination of Mr. Stephen, Mr. Roberts
immediately digressed from the issue and said:
And you know the measure of damages
which should be paid under the law, don't you?
"A. No.
"Q.

"Mr. Ashton: Wait just a minute please. If
the court please, we object to what the measure of
damages is. In this case there is only one question,
whether or not he fraudulently misrepresented what
this man stated.
(By Mr. Roberts) You know that one of
the elements is pain and suffering, don't you?
"Q.

"Mr. Ashton: Object to that, if the Court
please, as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.
The only question here is whether or not a false
misrepresentation was made."
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This objection was overruled and Mr. Roberts then
at some length asked the witness about pain and suffering,
loss of bodily function, loss of earnings, both past and
future and related matters which bad no possible probative
value on the issue of alleged fraudulent misrepresentation.
How the matters. related by Mr. Roberts' cross-examination
could possibly bear on this issue is beyond counsel's comprehension. Such matters do relate to possible mutual mistake of fact.
(b)

The uncontradicted evidence fails to show
that the parties to the release executed the
release because of mutual mistake of fact.

Even if mutual mistake of fact had been plead, the
foregoing evidence has only a possible relevancy. That
possibility depends upon whether or not there is probative
evidence which proves or tends to prove there was a mutual
mistake of fact upon ll'hich both parties relied.
This proposition of law is stated in the Kirchgestner
case, supra. wherein the Utah Supreme Court said:
''Since mutual mistake of fact consists of a
belief by both parties that a certain fact exists
whereas in reality it does not exist or is not true,
both the belief of the parties in the supposed true
fact and existence of the true fact must be proved
by the same degree of proof. The mistake is a unit
circumstance. One of its prongs cannot be proved
by a mere preponderance of evidence and other by
clear, unequhTocal and convincing evidence. Hence
in a jurisdiction requiring mutual mistake of fact to
be proved by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, (which the author of this opinion thinks is
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l~

required in this jurisdiction) if there is no doubt
that both parties contracted in the light of a belief
that a certain situation or condition was true and
it is claimed by one party that their belief was in
fact a mistaken belief, the latter must prove by clear,
unequivocal and convincing evidence that the situation or condition in reliance on which the contract
was made, was at the time of making thereof different from that which both parties supposed or
believed."

t1
I"

,.; ..
1,.·

(.

~

The respondent stated that at the time he entered into
the release he did so because he felt that if he drid not do
so he would lose his job. This was his reason for signing
the release. No one claims that this was a mutual mistake
of fact. To the contrary, it was claimed that this was a
fraudulent misrepresentation, which by its very terminology
eliminates mutual mistake of fact. The respondent stated
that he was ready to go back to work and that the doctor
had released him for that purpose. He did not claim that
anyone was mistaken in this regard ; in fact, he continued
to work steadily for over two years and was working at
the time of trial. Therefore, this could not constitute a
mistake of fact, let alone a mutual mistake. But, even
should we assume that the respondent was mistaken as
to the facts of his injury, where is the evidence that the
railroad was mistaken? The fact that Mr. Stephen knew
or did not know that under the law a court or jury could
award damages for lost wages, pain and suffering, loss of
bodily function and so forth does not prove or tend to prove
that the railroad was laboring under a mistake as to the
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extent of respondent's. injuries. The only questions put
to Mr. Stephen relative to mistake were the following:
And as a matter of fact when you made
this settlement, you didn't know and you felt-Strike
that. At the time you made this settlement it was
your idea that he had no permanent disability, wasn't
it?
"A. As far as I know that is right.
"Q.

Well, that was the basis you made the settlement on, wasn't it?
"A. I made the settlement on the basis of the
complete injuries."
"Q.

How could any fact finder find from such evidence that
this constituted mutual mistake of fact upon which the
parties relied in making a settlement. The fact is, the foregoing testimony clearly shows there ~vas no mutual mistake
upon which the parties relied.
In the K irchgestner case, supra, the claim agent called
the doctor who advised that the plaintiff was all right and
that he could go back to work. Relying on this, the claim
agent and the plaintiff executed a release. Subsequent evidence indicated that the plaintiff \vas not all right and that
he could not continue his \York.
So far as the instant case is concerned, the claim agent
settled the case relying on respondent's representation that
he was ready and able to continue his employment. The
undisputeo evidence sho\YS that this was not a mistake but
was and is the fact. There was no discussion about perma·
nent or temporary disability. The discussion allegedly
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centered around false representations about employment
and the effect of consulting a lawyer.
(c) The undisputed evidence shows that respondent did not sustain a permanent disability
as a proximate result of his injury.
It is claimed by respondent that the alleged mutual
mistake of fact related to the permanency of respondent's
disability resulting from the pain and limitation of motion
caused by a callous formation on the top of his left shoulder.
Dr. Clegg testified that respondent had a callous formation, as diagnosed from X-ray readings, on the top of
his shoulder. This, and only this he believed, would cause
a 10% permanent disability measured at the shoulder. This
disability would be reduced to something less than 5% of
the person, and would be minimal. He had not seen the
patient until almost two years after the injury. The X-rays
which he interpreted were taken almost two years after
the incident. He had not seen X-rays taken at the time of
the injury.
Dr. Hubbard testified on behalf of the appellant. He
had treated respondent. He saw him on the day of his injury and placed his shoulder back into position. He also
saw X-rays taken that same day. These X-rays, he reported,
showed the callous formation referred to by Dr. Clegg in
the same position and in the same stage of growth as the
callous observed by Dr. Clegg in the X -rays taken two years
later.
No doctor was called to refute this testimony. It stands
undisputed. It therefore appears from the undisputed expert testimony that respondent's permanent disability, if
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any, stems from a callous formation on his shoulder which
existed at the time he was injured, and which therefore
could not have been caused by his injury.
It is no answer to Dr. Hubbard's testimony to say that
respondent's lawyers and the jurors can make a different
interpretation of the X-rays than the expert witness. Counsel recalls that Mr. Roberts so advised the jury by arguing
that an X-ray was like any other photograph and that they
could make their own interpretation. This is not the law.
The rule is well stated in Wigmore on evidence, Vol. III,
page 192 as follows:
"It follows that an x-ray photograph (of a condition of the human body, at any rate) should not
be offered and shown to the jury 'Without the testimony of a witness qualified to interpret."
In Russell v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co. of Utah, 53
Utah 457; 174 P. 633, the Utah Supreme Court passed on
this question and said:
"It is next contended that the court erred in
admitting in evidence certain radiographs or x-ray
photographs, showing the condition of plaintiff's
hip and hip joint. It is insisted that the radiographs
had a tendency· to mislead the jurors who were
merely laymen, and thus possessed no knowledge
respecting the injuries to the bone or the hip or hip
joint. If the radiographs had been introduced for
the purpose indicated by counsel, there would be
much force to their contention. A jury of laymen
possessing no kno,vledge nor experience respecting
the bones and injuries thereto might easily be misled by a mere x-ray photograph or radiograph by
which at the best n1erely the outline of the bone can
be shown. The radiographs were, however, not introduced for the purpose indicated by counsel. They
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were used by the doctors in illustrating their evidence, and were fully explained, and were introduced in evidence only as affording a fuller and
clearer understanding by the jury of the doctors'
testimony respecting the condition of plaintiff's injured hip and hip joint. The court committed no
error in receiving the radiographs for the purpose
for which they were received and used."
Dr. Hubbard was a disinterested witness who had
treated the respondent over a period of time to the respondent's complete satisfaction. He is not employed by the
appellant but by the respondent's hospital association. His
testimony with reference to the x-rays was not disputed.
Such evidence cannot he disregarded. The rule is well stated
in In Re Miller's Will, 90 P. 1002 at page 1006 as follows:
"It is firmly established everywhere that, as a
general rule, when a disinterested witness, who is
in no way discredited by other evidence, testified
to a fact within the knowledge of such witness,
which is not in itself improbable, or in conflict with
other evidence, the witness is to be believed, and the
facts so given are to be taken as legally established.
Kavanagh v. Wilson, 70 N.Y. 177; Evans v. George,
80 Ill. 51; In re John Immel's Estate, 59 Wis. 249,
18 N. W. 182."

POINT III.
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE
ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7.
Appellant requested the court to give Instruction No.
7 which was as follows:
"You are instructed that one of the issues raised
in this case is whether the release executed and given
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by plaintiff to the defendant Railroad was obtained
through alleged misrepresentatio~s made by defendant's agent Stephens.
"In that connection you are to consider only
the evidence relating to plaintiff's claim that defendant's agent represented that if plaintiff did not
execute and deliver the release he would lose his job.
"You are not called upon to decide and must
completely disregard and eliminate from your deliberations any consideration as to the adequacy or
inadequacy, fairness or unfairness of the consideration paid for said release. The court holds as a
matter of law that a valid legal consideration was
paid for said release and the only question before
you is whether said release was procured through
misrepresentations as aforesaid." (R. 152).
The court refused to give the above instruction. Counsel particularly felt that an instruction similar to the one
requested was applicable and pertinent to the case at hand
because of the evidence which had been received over counsel's objection relating to elements which are ordinarily
considered by fact finders in determining what is a reasonable amount to pay for one who has sustained injury. With
such evidence before it, it 'Yas of course tempting for the
jury to determine whether or not the amount agreed upon
between the respondent and the appellant railroad in the
release was a fair amount and an amount ,,·hich they would
have found had they been determining the case. This, of
course, was not the issue. The issue 'vhich "·as originally
framed was 'vhether or not the respondent had been fraudulently induced to enter into the release and as subsequently
amended vvhether or not there had been a mutual mistake
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of fact. The jury should not have been permitted without
instruction from the court to speculate about these facts
and determine what they would consider a fair settlement
for the injuries alleged.
The error became particularly apparent during the
argument to the jury. Mr. Black on two occasions told the
jury that they could find what was a fair amount in determining the issues in this case. We submit that this was
a palpable error and deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons given we submit that the court should
reverse said case and order a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Clifford L. Ashton,
For VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.
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